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Effects of public procurement of R&D on the innovation process: 





Purpose: The study investigates how pre-commercial procurement (PCP) influences the activities, 
capabilities and behaviours of actors participating in the innovation process. Unlike much of PCP 
research underpinned by a market failure theoretical framework that evaluates the additionality of 
innovation inputs and outputs, this paper focuses on the role and capacity of PCP in addressing 
systemic failures impeding the process of innovation.  
 
Design/methodology/approach: PCP effects on the innovation process were studied through a 
qualitative study of the UK Small Business Research Initiative (SBRI) programme. Data collection 
comprised 33 semi-structured interviews with key informants within 30 organisations, and analysis of 
80-plus secondary data sources. Interviewees included executives of technology-based small 
businesses, managers within public buying organisations, and innovation policy makers and experts. 
 
Findings: The UK SBRI improves connectivity and instigates R&D related interactions and cooperation. 
Through securing government R&D contracts, small firms access relevant innovation ecosystems, 
build up their knowledge and capabilities, and explore possible routes to market. Public organisations 
use the SBRI to connect to innovative small firms and access their sets of expertise and novel ideas. 
They also learn to appreciate the strategic role of procurement. Nonetheless, SBRI-funded small 
business face commercialisation and innovation adoption challenges due to institutional constraints 
pertaining to rules, regulations and public-sector norms of conduct.  
 
Research implications: The study contributes to existing PCP research by demonstrating innovation 
process-related effects of PCP policies. It also complements literature on small business-friendly public 
procurement measures by highlighting the ways through which PCP, rather than commercial 
procurement procedures, can support the development of small businesses other than just facilitating 
their access to government (R&D) contracts. 
 
Policy implications: The study identifies several challenge areas that policy makers should address to 
improve the implementation of the UK SBRI programme.  
 
Originality/value: The study demonstrates the effects of PCP on the activities, capabilities and 
behaviours of small businesses and public buying organisations involved in the innovation process.   
 
Keywords: pre-commercial procurement; innovation; small and medium-sized enterprises; public 












1. Introduction  
Public procurement can be used strategically to implement government policy (Harland et al., 2019). 
Governments, as major customers, have a unique capability to shape and direct supply markets to 
promote various policy objectives including sustainability, local economic growth, small business 
development, and innovation (e.g. Kattel and Lember, 2010; Brammer and Walker, 2011; Glass and 
Essig, 2018). The power of the public purse offers a strong rationale for the strategic role of public 
procurement: an average of 15% of global annual GDP (over $10 trillion) is spent through government 
procurement (UNOPS, 2014). In Europe, public procurement expenditure account for around 20% of 
GDP (European Commission, 2014), with UK expenditure currently forming approximately 14% of GDP 
(HM Government, 2017). 
This paper focuses on the role of public procurement of R&D, widely known as pre-commercial 
procurement (PCP), in pursuing, in combination, innovation and small business development policy 
objectives. PCP is defined as the family of approaches entailing government contracting for R&D 
services that may subsequently contribute to the development of products or services that are 
currently not available in the market (Rigby, 2016). PCP essentially involves product development and 
prototyping activities and even the manufacturing of small volumes for field testing, but excludes 
commercialisation activities. This latter feature makes PCP clearly distinguishable from processes of 
commercial procurement of innovation (Iossa et al., 2018).  
Prominent examples of PCP instruments internationally include the U.S. Small Business 
Innovation Research (SBIR) programme, the European Union (EU) PCP framework, and the UK Small 
Business Research Initiative (SBRI). These approaches present some differences in terms of how they 
are legally defined and implemented in detail. For instance, unlike the U.S. SBIR, the European PCP 
scheme mandates that public buying organisations must not bear all procurement costs (Rigby, 2016). 
These approaches, however, also have many characteristics in common. Indeed, the U.S. SBIR inspired 
the development of PCP schemes in Europe, including the UK SBRI, which follow a competitive process 
to award R&D contracts in phases. In with the EU PCP instrument, the UK SBRI scheme does not permit 
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public buying organisations to exclusively own intellectual property resulting from R&D projects 
(Connell, 2009).   
The approaches above that are collectively termed PCP aim to stimulate innovation that 
contributes to improving the delivery of public services and addressing grand societal challenges 
(Edquist et al., 2015). In tandem, PCP seeks to support the development of innovative small and 
medium sized enterprises (SMEs) and the creation of new firms, thereby fostering economic growth 
(Audretsch, 2003). It is noted that, with the exception of the U.S. SBIR, PCP processes are formally 
agnostic to firm size and any organisation, including large ones, can compete for advertised R&D 
contracts. However, in practice PCP policies tend to emphasise public sector engagement with 
technology-based small businesses and start-ups (Connell, 2017). 
Existing research on public procurement policies seeking to promote small business 
development stresses measures that help remove access barriers and increase SME participation in 
government contracting (Harland et al., 2019). Such measures largely refer to commercial 
procurement settings, where SME products are already available in the market. Although SME 
innovation objectives are noted (Kidalov and Snider, 2011), they do not seem to be the main focus of 
policy interventions. Discussed measures also underplay settings where the government acts as a ‘lead 
customer’ of disruptive technological solutions that are under development by SMEs.  
Literature on innovation-oriented public procurement, on the other hand, stresses the 
functionality of PCP in terms of fostering small business innovation relevant to unmet public sector 
needs (Connell, 2009). It discusses how small businesses may benefit from PCP and provides evidence 
of the impacts of PCP policies e.g. in terms of creation of new firms, small firm growth, and 
employment (Lerner, 1999; Link and Scott, 2018). Such literature is largely underpinned by a market 
failure theoretical framework and examines how PCP policies address failures related to externalities 
of knowledge production and to information asymmetries. Existing PCP evaluation studies focus on 
additionality of innovation inputs (e.g. additional funding small firms attract) and outputs /outcomes 
7 
 
(e.g. number of patents filed; small firm growth and survival rates) that can be attributed to 
government R&D contracts awarded to small businesses (Link and Scott, 2010; Rigby, 2016).  
However, we still know relatively little about the effects that PCP policies have on the process 
of innovation i.e. how they might influence the activities, capabilities and behaviours of small 
businesses and public buying agencies involved in converting R&D funds and resources to innovation 
outputs /outcomes (Hughes et al., 2011; Edler et al., 2016). This alternative focus is pertinent since 
government procurement in general, and PCP in particular, have a role in addressing systemic failures 
influencing the innovation process (Edquist and Hommen, 1999; Rigby, 2016) such as SME capability 
shortfalls and limited connectivity and R&D cooperation between small firms and public agencies. 
Drawing on a systems-of-innovation perspective (Edquist, 1997), this paper seeks to answer the 
following research question (RQ): How, and to what extent, does PCP help address systemic failures 
with a view to facilitating the innovation process? 
This RQ is pursued through an empirical investigation of the UK SBRI scheme based on 33 
qualitative interviews and analysis of publicly available secondary data. The UK is a suitable research 
setting for two reasons. First, the UK Government has placed an emphasis on the SBRI as the country’s 
flagship policy of innovation-oriented procurement (HM Government, 2017). This policy is, in tandem, 
used as a means to foster public sector engagement with innovative small firms (Innovate UK, 2015). 
Second, the UK SBRI is a prominent instrument within the wider family of approaches that are 
collectively labelled PCP. It is the most mature and largest (in terms of number of competitions and 
total contract value) scheme of its kind in Europe. It is thus more conducive to an analysis of its effects 
on the innovation process, compared to smaller-scale European PCP schemes. 
 The study contributes to research on PCP and innovation-oriented public procurement more 
broadly by shifting attention towards PCP effects on the innovation process, rather than on innovation 
inputs and outputs /outcomes. Specifically, the study shows how PCP addresses systemic issues 
related to connectivity, cooperation, learning and capability development, and demand articulation 
and experimentation. The research also complements the literature on SME-friendly public 
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procurement policies by identifying multiple ways through which PCP, rather than commercial 
procurement, supports the development of small firms other than just facilitating their access to 
government (R&D) contracting. The study also identifies challenges regarding the SBRI 
implementation that policy makers should attend to improve the effectiveness of the scheme. 
 The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. The next section reviews the relevant 
literature, after which the research method is discussed (Section 3). Section 4 presents the analysis 
and findings. Section 5 discusses the findings and draws out research and policy implications.  
 
2. Literature review  
2.1. Public procurement and small business development  
Government procurement is used to promote small business development goals (Dennis, 2011; 
Harland et al., 2019). SMEs face significant challenges regarding their engagement in public sector 
contracting. These include the inability to bid for large, bundled contracts, stringent pre-qualification 
requirements in tenders, administrative burden related to bidding, cash flow issues and awareness of 
tender opportunities (Flynn and Davis, 2015). Accordingly, a wide range of procurement policy 
measures have been designed to remove access barriers and improve SME participation in 
government contracting. Harland et al. (2019) studied SME-friendly procurement measures across 
eleven countries and identified two main categories: financially- and information-oriented measures. 
The former aim to improve resource availability and capacity of SMEs (e.g. through specialist support, 
financial assistance, prompt payments, and preferential treatment), while the latter seek to influence 
SME propensity to engage in government contracting (e.g. through dedicated websites and measuring 
SME engagement). Factors such as SME tendering capabilities, unbundling of contracts, contract 
value, and procurement procedure used influence SME success (e.g. Flynn and Davis, 2017), although 
Glass and Essig’s (2018) suggestion that lot-sizing does not contribute to SME success is noted.   
The literature is also concerned with the effectiveness of implemented procurement measures. 
For instance, Loader (2018) suggests that the UK Government’s target of 25% SME spending was 
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ostensibly met and that regulation and enforcement was used to implement SME policies such as the 
‘contracts finder’ tool and the elimination of pre-qualification questionnaires for below-threshold 
central government purchases. However, there is also evidence of the inability to implement SME-
friendly procurement policies in impactful ways (e.g. Kidalov and Snider, 2011; Flynn and Davis, 2015). 
This is due to tensions between different objectives of public buyers (e.g. sustainability and local 
growth vs. efficiency and value for money), restrictions placed by EU public procurement regulations 
and a risk aversion culture (Preuss, 2011; Georghiou et al., 2014).  
Overall, the literature on SME-friendly procurement policies refers to commercial procurement 
settings where SME products and services are market-ready. Although certain studies have noted the 
relevance of SME innovation outcomes (Aschhoff and Sofka 2009; Uyarra et al., 2014), these do not 
seem to be in focus. Specifically, this literature stream largely underplays settings of pre-commercial 
procurement where R&D contracts awarded to small firms are used to stimulate the development of 
innovative products that do not yet exist (for an exception see Kidalov and Snider, 2011).  
 
2.2. Public procurement and innovation  
In the context of innovation policy, public procurement is seen as a distinct demand-side policy 
instrument aiming to articulate demand for innovative solutions that help improve public services and 
address grand societal challenges (Hommen and Rolfstam, 2008). Although the deployment of public 
procurement as a means of instigating innovation is nothing new (e.g. see Rothwell, 1984; Dalpe et 
al., 1992), its potential has recently re-surfaced as part of an increasing emphasis on demand-side 
instruments within the innovation policy mix (Edler and Georghiou, 2007).  
Evidence of benefits resulting from innovation procurement projects is largely based on case 
studies of implementation in multiple countries (Edquist et al., 2015; Nijboer et al., 2017). These 
demonstrate that innovation-oriented government procurement can potentially deliver cost savings, 
improve public services and generate wider societal benefits (Rolfstam, 2013). Despite positive 
evidence and a supportive rhetoric internationally (Lember et al., 2014), there is an ongoing debate 
10 
 
regarding the extent to which innovation-oriented procurement processes, as executed by public 
buyers and in interaction with suppliers, align with relevant policy goals and aspirations (Georghiou et 
al., 2014). This literature also suggests that the uptake of innovation procurement processes and 
practices is rather slow (Rolfstam, 2013; European Commission, 2014; OECD, 2014). Implementation 
challenges range from misaligned incentives, limited use of innovation-friendly tendering practices 
(e.g. outcome-based specifications), shortfall on innovation procurement capabilities, myopic views 
of the process of identifying needs, management of uncertainty and risks related to the innovation 
process, and lack of administrative support systems (e.g. Uyarra et al., 2014; Edquist et al., 2015). 
Analysis of effects of innovation-oriented procurement practices on supplier firms does not 
explicitly distinguish between large and small suppliers. However, the literature draws a distinction 
between public procurement of innovation (PPI), which concerns large-scale commercial procurement 
of already tried and tested products (Edler and Yeow, 2016), and PCP. This distinction is relevant to 
innovative SMEs since PCP entails the unbundling of R&D activity from subsequent commercial 
procurement, and facilitates awarding smaller R&D contracts to multiple firms (Timmermans and 
Zabala-Iturriagagoitia, 2013; Iossa et al., 2018). In this sense, PCP is well-placed to contribute towards 
achieving the twin goals of innovation and small business development.  
 
2.3. Pre-commercial procurement  
PCP entails that R&D contract awardees engage in proof-of-concept research and subsequently in 
product development and prototyping activities (Edquist et al., 2015). With the exception of the U.S. 
SBIR programme, PCP instruments stop short of commercialisation activities. This has raised doubts 
of whether PCP is a demand-side policy given a lack of commercial procurement (Edquist and Zabala-
Iturriagagoitia, 2015). Nonetheless, there seems to be agreement in the literature that PCP qualifies 
as a type of procurement since it entails contracts for R&D services (Connell, 2009; Rigby, 2016). PCP 
tends to be targeted and problem-oriented, rather than general-purpose (Edquist et al., 2015). This 
means that PCP is often initiated to address a government operational need, although it can also be 
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used to tackle a generic policy problem facing multiple public and private sector organisations, even 
cross-nationally (Yeow et al., 2017).  
The most widely known PCP initiative is the U.S. SBIR programme, which was established in 
1982 to incentivise the engagement of small businesses in US Federal R&D activity and to promote 
innovative ideas with commercialisation potential. The SBIR programme is mandated meaning that as 
of 2017 all Federal agencies with an R&D budget in excess of $100 million are obliged to spend 3.2% 
of that budget for R&D activities performed by small businesses (Small Business Administration, 2014). 
The SBIR programme resembles a gate-stage model of R&D and operates based on three distinct 
phases (Small Business Administration, 2017). Phase 1 concerns concept development and focuses on 
establishing the technical and commercial feasibility of the R&D project. Phase 2 refers to prototyping 
and seeks to demonstrate the commercialisation potential of the product under development. Phase 
3 allows small businesses to pursue commercialisation activities related to earlier R&D work, but 
involves no further SBIR funding. Federal agencies, as users of R&D results, are responsible for funding 
additional work during this third phase. 
PCP policies in Europe originate in attempts to imitate the U.S. SBIR. First the UK in the early 
2000s, and later other European countries developed specific policies for public procurement of R&D 
(Rigby, 2016). Currently, three PCP schemes operate in Europe: the UK SBRI, the Dutch SBIR and the 
Flemish Procurement of Innovation scheme designed by the Government of Flanders in Belgium. The 
European Union has also developed its own PCP framework which is compliant with principles of equal 
treatment and fair competition, and the avoidance of state aid. This means that compared to the U.S. 
SBIR, European PCP schemes cannot exclusively target small businesses or directly support their 
commercialisation activities and growth (Apostol, 2014). 
Regarding the impacts of PCP, the literature focuses on the effects of the U.S. SBIR programme 
because it is the most well-established one. European PCP schemes are relatively recent and as such 
rigorous evaluations of their effects present challenges (Rigby, 2016). Evidence regarding the U.S. SBIR 
programme suggests that it provides critical funding that tackles small firms’ R&D under-investment 
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(Link and Scott, 2010), although SBIR funds can also crowd-out company-funded R&D (Wallsten, 
2000). SBIR funding enables the creation of new firms and fosters private-sector R&D and subsequent 
commercialisation activity that would not otherwise had been possible (Audretsch et al., 2002; Link 
and Scott, 2018). In addition, SBIR contracts lead to spill over effects in the sense that successful 
project demonstrations motivate more scientists to start new firms. Small firms winning SBIR contracts 
experience accelerated growth and improve their chances of attracting additional VC funding due to 
the so-called ‘quality certification’ effect (Lerner, 1999). Regarding employment growth, evidence 
suggests that the SBIR’s impact is small (Wallsten, 2000; Link and Scott, 2012).  
Overall, this literature is informed by a market failure rationale for policy intervention and 
focuses on the additionality of innovation inputs (funds) and outputs /outcomes of PCP. Innovation 
policies underpinned by market failure theories stress government intervention to ‘fix’ failures in 
finance for innovation caused by positive externalities and lack of incentives of the private sector to 
invest in early-stage R&D, as well as information asymmetry-related failures (e.g. limited visibility of 
new firms and their technologies). Accordingly, PCP policies help to address such market failures by 
funding highly-uncertain R&D at its early stages, incentivising the creation of new firms, promoting 
small firms with high potential and helping them to attract additional private sector funding, and 
contributing to small business growth more generally (Connell, 2009; Mazzucato, 2015; Rigby, 2016).  
Despite its usefulness, a market failure approach does little to explain how PCP might influence 
the process of innovation in terms of the activities, capabilities and behaviours of participating actors. 
Examples of process-related issues include the ability of small firms to connect to public sector 
organisations (as potential customers) and to understand their unmet needs, to engage in cooperative 
R&D projects with relevant stakeholders, and to develop technical and commercial know-how (Salles-
Filho et al., 2011; Iossa et al., 2018). Such issues pertain to system-level deficiencies that potentially 
inhibit the innovation process, and PCP policies have a role in addressing some of these (Ribgy, 2016). 
An analysis of systemic failures invites a systems-of-innovation approach to innovation policy design 
and implementation.  
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2.4. A systems-of-innovation perspective on innovation policy 
The systems-of-innovation approach is one of the dominant theories underpinning innovation policy 
research and practice (Schot and Steinmueller, 2018). It conceptualises innovation as an iterative 
process (entailing ‘feedback loops’) which unfolds between interdependent producers and users of 
knowledge (Edquist, 1997). The systems-of-innovation perspective goes beyond market incentives as 
the key driver of innovation activity and emphasises the value of interactive learning and cooperation 
among economic actors. It also stresses the central role that institutions (e.g. formal rules and 
regulations, property rights, norms of conduct and culture-driven behaviours) play in the innovation 
process (Edquist and Hommen, 1999). Institutions, as humanly devised constraints that structure 
incentives and shape and regulate interactions in economy and society (North, 1990), can either 
enable or hinder innovation. While some institutions such as a well-developed property rights 
framework can incentivise R&D activity, others (e.g. dated regulations falling behind technological 
advancements) can also impede innovation development and adoption (Edquist and Johnson, 1997).  
Compared to a market failure theoretical framework emphasising challenges pertaining to 
externality effects and information asymmetries in innovation markets, the systems-of-innovation 
approach focusses on systemic failures that impede or slow down innovation (Mazzucato, 2015). 
These systemic problems refer to a lack of interactions and cooperation among actors, limited access 
to complementary knowledge and capabilities, weak demand for innovation, technological lock-in and 
sunk cost effects, limited ability or willingness to adopt innovations, and institutional failures 
pertaining to formal rules, norms and behaviours (Dodgson et al., 2011; Edler and Fagerberg, 2017). 
It follows that innovation policies informed by a systems-of-innovation approach seek to 
achieve some of the following goals: a) foster connectivity and cooperation among actors, b) promote 
and incentivise cooperation in R&D and innovation activity, c) support learning and capability 
development, d) articulate demand for innovative solutions and facilitate experimentation with early-
stage concepts or technologies, and e) seek to shape an institutional environment conducive to 
innovation by mitigating institutional barriers to the innovation process (Dodgson et al., 2011; Edler 
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et al., 2016). A systems-of-innovation approach is particularly well-suited to conceptualise, analyse 
and evaluate demand-side innovation policies, and especially innovation-oriented public procurement 
policy instruments, due to its emphasis on demand-related issues (Edquist and Hommen, 1999). 
The existing PCP literature has recognised the relevance of a systems-of-innovation approach 
e.g. with respect to effects of PCP on SME engagement in government innovation contracting (Rigby, 
2016; Iossa et al., 2018). However, we still have a limited understanding of how PCP policies contribute 
to tackling systemic failures to facilitate collaboration and interactive learning between public 
organisations and innovative firms, including SMEs, seeking to innovate. The empirical study 
presented in the following sections seeks to expand our knowledge in this area. 
 
3. Research method 
Given the scant empirical research specifically on the role of PCP in addressing systemic failures 
inhibiting the innovation process, a qualitative research design based on semi-structured interviews 
(Marshall and Rossman, 1999) was adopted to develop in-depth understanding. The empirical study 
focused on the UK SBRI, which is the national policy for public procurement of R&D. Similar to the U.S. 
SBIR programme, the UK SBRI employs a phased approach meaning that participating firms bid for 
successive R&D contracts. Phase 1 contracts, which are worth £50-100k on average and last up to six 
months, concern proof-of-concept research for establishing the technical and financial viability of the 
innovative solution. Companies successfully completing Phase 1 contracts can be invited to tender for 
Phase 2 contracts for prototype development. Successful bidders are expected to build, test and 
demonstrate a prototype. This work typically lasts up to two years and is worth up to £1 million. 
 The role of the SBRI scheme in stimulating innovation in the UK economy has been highlighted 
in numerous parliamentary reports (e.g. House of Commons Science and Technology Select 
Committee, 2017). The SBRI is also explicitly referred to in the UK Industrial Strategy as a government 
procurement tool for instigating innovation and supporting the growth of innovative SMEs (HM 
Government, 2017). Two recent reviews of the SBRI commissioned by the UK Government (Rigby and 
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Roper, 2015; Connell, 2017) suggest that although the SBRI has not reached its full potential, it 
supports technologically-adept small businesses and public sector customers to accelerate their 
innovation efforts. This study examines these issues systematically and teases out related challenges. 
The empirical study comprised 33 semi-structured interviews with key informants within 30 
organisations. Appendix 1 provides details of the interviewees, which included policy makers and 
innovation policy experts affiliated with Innovate UK, the national innovation agency, and the UK 
Government Department of Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS). These individuals were 
chosen because of their expertise in the SBRI scheme. Three public agencies, operating in the defence, 
pharmaceutical and healthcare sectors respectively, were also interviewed to understand how and 
why they use the SBRI scheme. In addition, key informants from 22 SMEs that have participated in 
SBRI competitions and /or projects were interviewed to elicit data on their views and experiences. 
These firms were identified through review of publicly available data (e.g. Innovate UK and SBRI 
Healthcare reports) on SBRI competitions and awarded R&D contracts. The sampling of SMEs 
intentionally included firms that develop new products and technologies in different public sector 
application areas. The majority of studied small firms operate within healthcare and defence, but this 
is not surprising given that the National Health Service (NHS) and the UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) 
are the two key users of the SBRI. Companies awarded SBRI contracts by the Home Office, the 
Department for Transport, Department of BEIS and Innovate UK were also interviewed. The sampling 
mainly focused on small firms that have already been awarded Phase 1 and /or Phase 2 contracts. For 
comparison purposes, two firms that were unsuccessful in winning SBRI contracts were also 
interviewed. Table 1 presents the profile of the studied small firms. 
 
[Insert Table 1 about Here] 
 
 The interviews were conducted either face-to-face or via telephone with an average duration 
of approximately an hour. All but five interviews were audio-recorded and fully transcribed resulting 
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in 478 pages of transcription text. In the instances were audio recording was not possible, detailed 
written notes were taken and these were revisited and populated immediately after the interviews to 
maximise data accuracy and validity. An interview guide (Appendix 2) was developed and used in all 
interviews, although it was applied rather flexibly to consider also the mission and specific context of 
the buying organisations and small firms studied. The semi-structured interviews covered multiple 
themes with regard to SBRI policy aims and design, the current uptake of the SBRI by UK government 
Departments and public sector organisations, implementation approaches and practices, and the 
perceived effectiveness of the SBRI scheme.  
The interviewee accounts were augmented by analysing 80-plus documents and other sources 
of publicly available data. These sources included UK Government and parliamentary reports, SBRI-
related reports and statistics released by Innovate UK, SBRI Healthcare newsletters, MoD press 
releases and reports, and SBRI evaluation reports. The analysis of these documents helped to 
complement and triangulate the interview data e.g. with respect to trends in Phase 1 /Phase 2 contract 
awards by specific public agencies. Such basic quantitative analysis provided further insights regarding 
the status of SBRI implementation across the UK public sector.  
Data analysis proceeded in parallel with data collection, and in an iterative fashion to consider 
the emerging links between literature and the data (Miles and Huberman, 1994). Data coding was 
informed by relevant theories, notably the systems-of-innovation and market failure approaches. Data 
coding and analysis was aided by the ATLAS.ti software. As a first step, all data were stored and 
organised into an ATLAS.ti software database. Secondly, interview transcripts and documents were 
read in full to develop some high-level insights regarding the design and implementation of the SBRI. 
Thirdly, open codes were assigned to interview quotes and document excerpts (e.g. ‘small firm access 
to market and customers’, ‘networking’, ‘small firm technical knowledge’, ‘small firm learning’). 
Fourthly, these open codes were refined and grouped into higher-level categories (e.g. ‘small firm 
connectivity’ and ‘small firm learning and capability development’) using axial coding procedures 
(Strauss and Corbin, 1990). 
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4. Findings  
This section analyses how, and to what extent, the UK SBRI facilitates the innovation process by 
addressing relevant systemic failures. In line with a systems-of-innovation approach (Edquist and 
Hommen, 1999; Edler et al., 2016), five systemic issues that are pertinent to the scope and goals of 
the SBRI were identified: connectivity and interactions, R&D cooperation, learning and capability 
development, demand articulation and experimentation with innovative solutions, and small business 
access to government R&D contracting. The analysis also focuses on whether the SBRI can tackle 
institutional failures impeding the innovation process, and uncovers associated challenges. 
 
4.1. The role of the UK SBRI in facilitating the innovation process  
Table 2 presents evidence regarding the main motivations of small businesses to participate in SBRI 
competitions and projects, and classifies them according to the four out of the five systemic issues 
outlined above. Small firms in the sample did not refer to learning and capability development aspects 
when asked to explain their main motivations for engaging with the SBRI. In addition to the 
motivations appearing in Table 2, the vast majority of interviewed small firms indicated that another 
key reason for participating in the SBRI was financial. More specifically, interviewees from small 
businesses suggested that SBRI contracts provided them with funding to pursue R&D for which the 
company retains the rights to intellectual property. For many small businesses interviewed this would 
not had been possible to do without securing a SBRI contract due to lack of funds. Interviewees 
stressed difficulties to attract venture capital (VC) at early stages of technology development and 
pointed at the fact that SBRI projects do not require matched funding by the firm i.e. SBRI contracts 
provide 100% funding e.g. “SBRI has definitely got a role, it helps you be innovative, it’s cheap capital 
in so far as equity… it’s the only scheme that doesn’t require equity dilution […] your award is a contract 
of research and you own the IP in it, there are some caveats to the ownership of that IP, but you own 




[Insert Table 2 about Here] 
 
Table 3 summarises the key findings regarding the benefits and challenges of SBRI 
implementation on the ground, as perceived by the studied small businesses and public buying 
organisations using the scheme to contract for R&D services. These are, again, presented according to 
the five systemic issues in focus. Unlike the results of Table 2, multiple small firms highlighted learning 
and capability development-related benefits arising from their engagement in SBRI projects and 
tenders. This potentially suggests that small firms become aware of this functionality of the SBRI only 
after they have engaged in collaborative R&D projects with public buying agencies.   
 
[Insert Table 3 about Here] 
 
In sum, the findings suggest that the SBRI contributes towards addressing systemic problems 
and appears to have a positive bearing on the activities, capabilities and behaviours of participating 
small firms and public buying organisations. More specifically, small businesses benefit from 
expanding their R&D networks and nurturing useful connections, participating in cooperative R&D, 
acquiring knowledge and developing capabilities, and even generating additional innovation projects. 
They also become aware of business opportunities in the UK public sector, explore new (or alternative) 
routes to market, and enter relevant innovation ecosystems.  
Public organisations, on the other hand, seem to benefit from connecting with innovative SMEs 
they had previously been unaware of. They expand their R&D supplier networks beyond existing 
suppliers and gain access to innovative ideas of small firms. Public organisations that consistently use 
the SBRI also learn to appreciate the strategic role of procurement in helping them to meet their needs 
and goals. All these benefits refer mainly to the process of innovation, rather than to innovation funds 
or outputs /outcomes. They relate to learning, improved capabilities and altered activities and 
behaviours of small businesses and public agencies. In what follows, the ways in which the SBRI 
19 
 
addresses relevant systemic failures and facilitates the innovation process are elaborated, and 
associated challenges are highlighted.  
 
4.1.1. Connectivity and R&D related interactions 
The evidence presented in Table 2 and Table 3 suggests that the SBRI fosters connectivity and R&D 
related interactions among small businesses, public sector organisations and other stakeholders e.g. 
large supplying firms and universities. Multiple interviewees from small firms highlighted the role of 
the SBRI in providing access to markets and potential customers in the public sector. This finding is 
also prevalent in Connell’s (2017) review of the UK SBRI which was commissioned by the UK 
Government. This review showed that small firms engaging with the SBRI have been able to identify 
promising applications of their new technologies and connect to potential customers.  
 Small firms value opportunities presented during the execution of SBRI projects to engage 
with relevant innovation ecosystems (e.g. in public healthcare and defence), and to network with 
relevant actors e.g. public agencies, universities and larger firms. It is noted, however, that a small 
number of interviewees suggested that such interactions sometimes lack richness in that some 
government Departments or public agencies have little time to dedicate to small firms and to provide 
feedback on their product development efforts e.g. “We expected to engage a reasonable amount 
with the government and related people in the m-commerce sector and that did not happen” 
(Technical Director, S21). All three public buying organisations stressed that setting up SBRI 
competitions and getting involved in subsequent projects helped them to establish links to innovative 
small firms and to access their novel ideas and sets of expertise (see Table 3).  
 
4.1.2.   Cooperation in R&D  
The findings suggest that the SBRI incentivises cooperative R&D work intending to address unmet 
market needs in public and /or private sector application areas. Interviewees both from small firms 
and public buying organisations confirmed the role of the SBRI in scoping out and funding collaborative 
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R&D work which can also involve universities and specialist firms (Table 3) e.g. “we were developing 
within a consortium a set of technologies around the transfer of heat, summer heat, into winter, 
seasonal heat transfer so that we could solve the problem of heating from renewable sources […] the 
fit was good, and SBRI didn’t require match funding which is massive and that helps us swarm 
consortiums much more easily” (Managing Director, S22). Through their involvement in SBRI projects, 
small firms are able to connect to other firms which serve as partners, suppliers or even future 
competitors. Rigby and Roper’s (2015) evaluation of the UK SBRI study, commissioned by Innovate UK, 
also confirmed this positive role of the SBRI in enabling the creation of cooperative R&D networks.  
 Many small firm interviewees also noted that they engaged with the SBRI because they had 
felt that the issued R&D tenders had been a good match to their ongoing product development efforts. 
A few interviewees also indicated that SBRI competitions fully align with the company’s mission e.g. 
to improve patient outcomes through technology use. A concern raised by two small firms was a lack 
of coordination among innovation and commissioning units within public buying organisations (Table 
3). This fragmented approach can reduce the effectiveness of cooperative R&D and the subsequent 
exploitation of R&D project outputs. 
 
4.1.3. Small business learning and capability development 
Several small business interviewees stressed that a key benefit of engaging with the SBRI was building 
up technical knowledge and capabilities and other types of ‘soft’ skills (e.g. R&D project management 
and business plan development) e.g. “some of the techniques we have developed through both the 
energy project and the communicability project have been used in other areas […] the techniques or or 
the things we learned from doing that project we've applied elsewhere” (Technical Director, S20). Such 
learning results from interactions and collaborative work with public agencies, universities and other 
(larger) firms during the execution of SBRI projects (see Table 3).  
 Small firms also value the feedback they receive either during the SBRI tendering process or 
during SBRI contract execution. Such learning can also be useful for adjusting or even radically 
21 
 
changing the direction of their product development efforts e.g. by focusing on specific market 
applications or exploring new technology areas that hold promise for fulfilling public sector customers’ 
needs (Table 3). SBRI contracts also allowed some of the studied small firms to upgrade their human 
capital by hiring highly-skilled employees. However, it is not clear whether such investments in human 
resource upgrading endure after the end of SBRI projects. For example, the firm S13 was able to 
expand up to 14 highly-skilled employees because of the awarded SBRI contracts, but it subsequently 
reduced its workforce down to two employees due to the slow process of generating NHS sales. 
Overall, the findings are in line with Rigby and Roper’s (2015) conclusion that small businesses benefit 
from knowledge transfer, increase their access to specialist skills and even develop additional ideas 
for innovation projects. The latter was observed, albeit to a limited extent, in the present study too. 
 A small number of interviewees, nonetheless, stressed the need for closer and more 
meaningful interactions with potential end users to maximise learning opportunities. Richer 
interactions with end users help to generate additional feedback regarding potential product use(s) 
(see Table 3) which, in turn, drives the refinement of product development efforts. Some interviewees 
also noted that small businesses at early stages of product development may lack knowledge 
regarding regulatory compliance procedures, which risks delaying or even derailing their R&D projects. 
This issue was prominent in the healthcare setting. According to an SME interviewee with experience 
in medical device development projects, for instance: “the technology which looks promising from a 
university has been shoe-horned into a project application to fit a user need and the absence of 
knowledge and skills within any of the parties apart from ourselves about compliance and regulatory 
affairs has been very, very, very problematic” (Managing Director, S8).  
 
4.1.4. Demand articulation and experimentation with innovative solutions 
The SBRI enables UK Government Departments and public agencies to articulate their demand for 
innovative products and services that potentially solve intractable problems, address policy challenges 
or improve public services. Analysis of a sample of SBRI tendering documents suggests that a key 
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feature is the definition of unmet needs or challenge areas often using an outcome- or problem-based 
approach. An interviewee from P2, one of the public agencies studied, suggested that the SBRI also 
offers a mechanism to engage with large industry players as the potential end users of R&D results, 
and to leverage their expertise to co-define unmet market needs (Table 3). This enables designing SBRI 
competitions that are market-relevant and potentially impactful.   
Interviewees from both public organisations and small firms highlighted that the SBRI offers an 
opportunity to experiment with new ideas and solutions and to ‘fail fast’ in cases of unsuccessful 
projects. The Phase 1 /Phase 2 approach to R&D contracting means that public organisations are able 
to try out radical solutions without assuming excessive financial risks. At the same time, small firms 
can benefit from early-stage testing of their proposed solutions and use the feedback to make 
informed decisions regarding the potential of products under development e.g. “we did the initial SBRI 
project and came up with a prototype that essentially worked but it was not perfectly fit for purpose 
[…] so we spent almost two years cutting features off the system in order to actually develop something 
that is more useful. That is a good process [...] the senior management decided to self-fund that part 
of the project because they wanted to make it as soon as possible” (Project Manager, S14). 
Two interviewees, however, highlighted that the SBRI does not fully realise its role as a catalyst 
for market change and radical innovation due to implementation fragmentation. Continuity of SBRI 
tenders, either in terms of frequency of competitions or the lack of consistency in thematic areas 
addressed, can deter small firms and their investors from planning long-term (Table 3). One 
interviewee also suggested that the SBRI needs to be better integrated with national or sector-specific 
innovation strategies and related technology road-mapping exercises: “It’s a problem with the design 
of the SBRI in [the] context of the big picture […] we need to produce electric vehicles more cost 
effectively in 20 years’ time. The components that we don’t understand are batteries, power 
management cells, computers in cars, whatever. We’re going to have an SBRI competition to think 
about how we could do that in the future […] if the SBRI project is successful you could have then folded 
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that into the other programmes you have which take them through development” (Former Director of 
Innovation Programmes, Innovate UK). 
 
4.1.5. Small business access to government R&D contracting  
All three interviewees from the studied public organisations noted that the SBRI is a useful mechanism 
for expanding their network of R&D suppliers. A key SBRI benefit is that it allows them to develop 
cooperative links with innovative SMEs possessing specialised sets of expertise (Table 3). Multiple 
interviewees from both small firms and public organisations also stressed that the phased approach 
to R&D contracting encourages small businesses to participate in SBRI tenders. This is because the 
small size of contracts (particularly Phase 1 contracts) signals to small firms that they can effectively 
compete for government R&D business. Unbundling of R&D activity by using Phase 1 and Phase 2 
contracts also improves small firms’ chances of winning R&D contracts (see Table 3).  
The SBRI tends to attract bids mainly from small and micro firms. According to Innovate UK 
statistics, approximately 75% of all bids come from small businesses. Connell (2017), in his SBRI review, 
found that more than 60% of SBRI contracts are awarded to SMEs with a large proportion of the rest 
being awarded to universities, consultancies, or consortia of involving small firms and universities. 
Larger firms do not seem to seek SBRI funding: “larger businesses are not so much looking for these 
sorts of opportunities […] If you’ve got a great idea you don’t need £50,000 from us or anyone else you 
just get on and do it without the necessity of going through a competitive phase and in the process 
exposing your idea” (SBRI Account Manager 1, Innovate UK). 
Multiple interviewees also suggested that the SBRI contracting process entails reduced 
administrative burden as it is easy to participate in tenders, the bidding cycle is relatively short, 
opportunity costs are low, and R&D contract management and reporting procedures are light-touch 
(Table 3). Small firms in the sample reported no problems regarding timely payment. These findings 
are in line with a recent evaluation of the SBRI Healthcare programme by Rand Europe (Lichten et al., 
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2017) which concluded that a strength of the SBRI it its low administrative burden for small firm 
bidders and contract awardees.   
Despite all these positive aspects, both small firms and public agencies highlighted SBRI budget 
limitations and discontinuities (Table 3). This can affect the ability of small firms operating in specific 
technology areas to sustain and accelerate their product development efforts. Discontinuity of 
competitions appears to be a challenge particularly in the MoD’s SBRI programme. Analysis of 
secondary data regarding SBRI contracts awarded by the MoD in the period 1 April 2015 to 31 March 
2017 suggests that out of 149 awards, only fourteen were Phase 2 contracts. These were awarded to 
SMEs and universities across four different thematic competitions. The other 135 R&D contracts were 
of Phase 1-type. This finding suggests that, in the case of the MoD programme, there might be a lack 
of critical mass of SBRI projects moving from a proof-of-concept stage to prototyping and further 
development. Connell’s (2017) review of the UK SBRI also highlighted this issue.   
 
4.2. Institutional constraints post-SBRI contracting: commercialisation and adoption challenges 
Despite the positive influence of the UK SBRI on the innovation process, the research also uncovered 
challenges facing small firms after successful execution of SBRI contracts. The challenges reported by 
SMEs relate to their commercialisation activities, the alignment of SBRI contracting with commercial 
procurement processes, and the ability of public sector customer organisations to adopt innovations 
at pace and scale. Table 4 provides a summary of the key issues observed. Overall, these findings 
suggest that the SBRI appears to be less equipped to grapple with broader systemic failures pertaining 
to institutional barriers, notably regulatory constraints and public sector norms of conduct and 
behaviours that are not conducive to innovation.   
 




Many of small firm interviewees expressed concerns regarding their ability to commercialise 
SBRI-funded technologies, and noted that it is not clear to them what additional support is available 
after the completion of Phase 2 contracts. Unlike the U.S. SBIR programme which includes a formal 
Phase 3 for commercialisation activities and actively promotes the small businesses and technologies 
it funds, the UK SBRI stops short of commercialisation support due to the need to comply with the EU 
PCP legal framework. This can be problematic for small businesses that are less able to secure follow-
up finance, or have limited resources to invest in commercialisation and sales development activities 
(Table 4). Interviewees from public organisations and Innovate UK admitted that this regulatory 
requirement creates a gap between the successful completion of Phase 2 contracts and full 
commercialisation.   
In accordance with the EU PCP framework, the SBRI process is distinct from commercial 
procurement procedures. This means that a separate and independent tendering process is required 
for the large-scale commercial procurement of the SBRI-funded products to ensure that principles of 
competition and equal treatment are adhered to. There is essentially no guarantee to SBRI-funded 
firms that their innovations will be procured and adopted at scale. Many of the studied small 
businesses recognised such regulatory restrictions, but they also pointed at misaligned incentives and 
limited budgets as additional challenges with respect to commercial procurement (see Table 4). 
Several interviewees also highlighted the significant difficulties that small firms encounter when 
trying to sell their innovations to large public buying organisations, such as the NHS and the MoD. 
Innovation adoption challenges  seem to result from rigid professional norms of conduct, risk-aversion 
behaviours, and bureaucratic procedures within public organisations that discourage innovation (see 
Table 4) e.g. “It almost makes no sense to fund the early part of the development; you get all these 
fantastic innovations coming through when the only possible customer that we have in the UK – and 
there really is only one customer, that’s the NHS – is institutionally incapable of adopting or using 
them” (CEO, S5). 
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These findings are corroborated by three prominent SBRI policy evaluations (Rigby and Roper, 
2015; Connell, 2017, Rand Europe, 2017) that highlight very similar challenges facing small businesses 
regarding commercialisation and adoption of their innovative products by public sector customer 
organisations. Connell (2017), for example, noted the weak pull-through of SBRI-funded technologies 
in the UK public sector. 
It should be emphasised that addressing such wider institutional failures is beyond the remit of 
the SBRI scheme per se, and it would thus be inappropriate to assess the effectiveness of this policy 
instrument using this criterion.  These issues, nonetheless, clearly hinder the ability of small businesses 
and public buying organisations to maximise the value they gain from government R&D contracting. 
It is also noteworthy that some of the small firms in the sample that have yet to commercialise their 
SBRI-funded products referred to process-related benefits (e.g. networking, capability development 
and R&D process acceleration) as ‘intermediate’ or ‘latent’ ones e.g. “I think definitely most of the stuff 
that we’ve done through CDE, you might call it potential long-term benefit because it’s too early to say 
and it requires a lot of work to exploit it further. But I’m not going to say it’s a derived benefit, it’s not 
being realised” (CEO, S19). 
 
5. Discussion and conclusions  
The RQ posed in the introduction asked how, and to what extent, PCP helps in addressing systemic 
failures in order to facilitate the innovation process. The empirical findings highlight five main ways 
through which the UK SBRI, as one of the prominent PCP instruments internationally, can positively 
influence the activities, capabilities or behaviours (Hughes et al., 2011; Edler et al., 2016) of small firms 
and public buying organisations seeking to innovate. More specifically, the empirical study highlights 
how the SBRI contributes to addressing systemic failures (Dodgson et al., 2011; Rigby, 2016) by 
improving connectivity, R&D related interactions and cooperation of small firms and public buying 
organisations. Despite the fact that the UK SBRI is accessible also to large firms, the available evidence 
suggests that it tends to stimulate engagement mainly with technology-based small businesses. 
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Through securing government R&D contracts and carrying out SBRI-funded R&D projects, small firms 
get access to relevant innovation ecosystems, build up their knowledge and capabilities, and explore 
possible routes to market for their products under development. Public organisations, on the other 
hand, use the SBRI scheme to connect to innovative small businesses and to access their sets of 
expertise and novel ideas. They also appear to alter their attitudes regarding the role of public 
procurement in meeting their operational needs or policy goals.  
However, the UK SBRI clearly faces limitations in terms of its scope and ability to grapple with 
wider systemic failures relating to the institutional environment within which innovation development 
and adoption processes unfold (Edquist and Johnson, 1997). Specifically, the research uncovered 
commercialisation and innovation adoption challenges facing small firms after the completion of their 
SBRI contracts. These challenges result from regulatory constraints, rigid norms of conduct, 
bureaucratic rules and risk aversion behaviours within the UK public sector that collectively slow down 
or even impede small business-driven innovation.  
Regarding regulatory constraints pertaining to the legal framework underpinning the 
implementation of the SBRI (i.e. lack of commercialisation support and lack of commitment to procure 
the developed solutions), it is feasible that public buying bodies could lift some of these constraints 
by using the EU Innovation Partnership procedure (Iossa et al., 2018). More broadly, in European 
policy making and public procurement practitioner circles alike there have been debates as to whether 
PCP and the Innovation Partnership procedure overlap significantly. The author’s current research in 
the UK and the Netherlands suggests that there is convergence towards the view that both approaches 
add value, and that each may be favourable under certain conditions. In practice, some key factors 
driving the choice between PCP and the Innovation Partnership procedure include technology and 
market maturity, the level of the public agency’s commitment to procure the innovation under 
development, and the preferred allocation of intellectual property (see also PIANOo, 2020). In 
addition, the Innovation Partnership approach is often less suitable for engaging with SMEs due to the 
bundling of the R&D and large-scale production phases under the same contract (Iossa et al., 2018).  
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Nevertheless, it is possible to use both approaches in a synergistic way, especially when PCP projects 
can help the public buying body to gain knowledge and understanding of technical possibilities, which 
can subsequently feed into the development of specifications for an Innovation Partnership project.  
A comparison between the empirical findings and the systems-of-innovation literature reveals 
three main differences with respect to the proliferation of systemic failures, and how these are 
addressed. First, the findings suggest that the UK SBRI does not fully tackle systemic failures related 
to the supply of finance (Edler and Fagerberg, 2017) as a way to incentivise cooperative R&D activity. 
Although the SBRI provides 100% funding for R&D to participating firms, both the SMEs and the public 
agencies interviewed suggested that budgets for SBRI competitions and projects tend to be limited 
and /or discontinuous. Second, the empirical findings did not cover possible systemic failures 
pertaining to technological lock-in or sunk cost effects (Dodgson et al., 2011), although some 
interviewees hinted at such issues by suggesting that SBRI competitions need to be embedded in wider 
technology road-mapping strategies. Third, some types of institutional failures affecting the ability of 
small firms to engage effectively with large public organisations (e.g. such as the NHS) were not 
addressed by the empirical study. Such institutional failures relate to structural and governance 
aspects of public service delivery systems. For example, rules for activity-based hospital re-
imbursement methods in the NHS often impede the adoption of innovative technologies that would 
entail transfer of healthcare activities out of hospitals and into primary care.  
Overall, the findings regarding the effects of the UK SBRI on the innovation process are 
potentially transferable to other countries that use similar PCP instruments to stimulate technological 
innovation and to support small businesses. Recent research on the U.S. SBIR programme (Link and 
Scott, 2018; Audretsch and Link, 2018), for instance, emphasises three relevant process issues: small 
firm behaviour regarding R&D project selection, knowledge development patterns, and the relevance 
of small firms’ human, social and reputational capital. Specifically, SBIR contracts enable American 
small businesses to shift their R&D activity towards riskier innovation projects (i.e. projects with lower 
chances of commercialisation) with potentially higher returns. Choosing to pursue more ambitious 
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R&D projects also means that such firms develop critical technical knowledge and build up capabilities 
that might eventually contribute to future commercialisation outcomes (Link and Scott, 2018; 
Audretsch and Link, 2019). The human, social and reputational capital of small firms funded by the 
U.S. SBIR is also found to contribute to their success (Audretsch and Link, 2018). This implies that 
developing dense connections and R&D interactions and being able to attract highly skilled employees 
are intermediate benefits for SBIR-funded firms. The upshot here is that the U.S. SBIR programme is 
also concerned with process-related issues, which is perhaps best captured, albeit only implicitly, in 
the first legislated purpose of the programme referring to ‘stimulation of technological innovation’ 
(see Link and Scott, 2018).  
The findings are also potentially transferable to settings of PCP implementation in countries 
such as the Netherlands. A recent evaluation of the Dutch SBIR programme (Dialogic, 2017) stressed 
process-related benefits for R&D contracts awardees. These include forming a customer relationship 
with Dutch government departments, collaborating with other small firms, exploring potential 
solutions and related risks, thinking about market opportunities, and getting valuable feedback 
regarding the proposed solution and learning from such feedback e.g. developing capability in writing 
a business plan for commercialisation. Despite such benefits, the evaluation also suggested that 
commercialisation of SBIR-funded innovations is challenging given the limited role and support of 
public agencies during the commercialisation phase, and their loose commitment in terms of 
commercial procurement (Dialogic, 2017).  
In conclusion, the findings regarding SBRI effects on the innovation process are potentially 
transferable to other countries implementing PCP approaches. PCP can positively influence the 
activities, capabilities and behaviours of economic actors. However, after the completion of the PCP 
process commercialisation and innovation adoption outcomes appear to be impeded by regulatory 





5.1. Research implications and contributions 
The findings extend the existing literature in two main ways. First, the study contributes to PCP 
research by shifting attention towards the effects that the UK SBRI has on the process of innovation, 
rather than on inputs and outputs /outcomes and their additionality (e.g. Learner, 1999; Wallsten, 
2000; Audretsch, 2003; Link and Scott, 2010). More specifically, the study demonstrates how the SBRI 
can address systemic issues facing economic actors regarding connectivity and interactions, R&D 
cooperation, capability development, and demand articulation and experimentation with innovative 
ideas. Given that the UK SBRI shares common characteristics with other key PCP instruments, the 
findings suggest that PCP has a positive influence on the activities, behaviours and capabilities of small 
firms and public organisations and facilitates the innovation process (see also Link and Scott, 2018).  
The research also uncovered commercialisation and innovation adoption challenges facing 
technology-based small businesses. These originate in the limited ability of the UK SBRI to tackle 
broader institutional failures pertaining to regulatory, procedural and behavioural constraints. It is 
likely that such findings are less relevant for the U.S. SBIR programme, in that the latter does more to 
support commercialisation activities of small firms it funds (Audretsch and Link, 2018). These insights 
suggest that research on the evaluation of PCP instruments in European countries (e.g. Rigby, 2016) 
should pay more attention to the moderating effects of some of these institutional failures on PCP 
outcomes and impacts.   
Second, the study complements the literature on small business-friendly public procurement 
measures (e.g. Kidalov and Snider, 2011; Loader, 2018; Harland et al., 2019) by highlighting the 
multiple ways through which PCP (rather than commercial procurement) can support the 
development of innovative small firms, other than just facilitating their access to government (R&D) 
contracts. In particular, the research shows that small businesses that win government R&D contracts 
enter relevant innovation ecosystems and engage in R&D projects whose execution is beneficial in 
terms of developing connections, establishing contractual (customer) relationships with public 
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organisations, developing technical know-how and capabilities, and exploring potential technology 
applications and routes to market.  
As compared to commercial procurement-related policy measures designed to enable 
participation of small firms in government contracts (e.g. Flynn and Davis, 2015; Glass and Essig, 2018), 
the UK SBRI and other similar PCP approaches are likely to target a narrower pool of small businesses 
that are nascent or very young, technologically adept, creative, and highly specialised (Audretsch and 
Link, 2019). This might explain why PCP policies are well placed to foster the specific set of process-
related benefits outlined above e.g. emphasis on capability development of small firms and their 
formation of cooperative R&D relationships with relevant stakeholders. 
 
5.2. Policy implications  
The research presents implications for the implementation of the UK SBRI. The research identified 
certain challenge areas (Table 3) that need addressing. In particular, policy makers should better 
integrate the UK SBRI into national or sector-specific technology and innovation strategies in order to 
increase its use across UK Government departments and public agencies. In tandem, additional 
budgets should become available for SBRI competitions and contracts, especially of Phase 2-type. 
These measures would enable a more structured approach and improve continuity of SBRI 
contracting. In addition, there is a need to stimulate even richer interactions between SBRI-funded 
firms and public organisations, and especially end user communities. Coordination between different 
functional areas (e.g. R&D and procurement) within large public organisations such as the NHS and 
the MoD also needs improving. 
Policy makers should also tackle the observed gap between the successful completion of Phase 
2 contracts and full commercialisation of SBRI-funded technologies. Given the lack of a clear route to 
commercial procurement of SBRI-funded products due to regulatory constraints, two courses of action 
would be possible: a) clarify to small firms and signpost what form of support for commercialisation 
activities is available, and b) do more to increase awareness of promising firms amongst investors and 
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potential customers. The post-Brexit policy landscape potentially offers additional opportunities for 
active support of SBRI-funded firms (in line with the U.S. SBIR programme), if the UK was to deviate 
from EU public procurement laws and regulations.  
Additional effort is also required to accelerate the adoption of SBRI-funded innovations by 
fostering an innovation culture with large public sector organisations, and by shaping positive 
incentive structures (e.g. recognition of successful projects or performance-related bonus payments) 
to mitigate conservative attitudes of some civil servants and procurement professionals towards 
innovative technologies. Certain initiatives already in place (e.g. Academic Health Science Networks 
and the Accelerated Access Collaborative within the NHS) should be further supported and amplified 
to help increase the rate and scale by which technology-based SMEs and their new products /services 
penetrate public sector supply chains.  
 
5.3. Limitations and future research 
The study presents limitations that warrant further research. First, the empirical study focused on the 
UK SBRI scheme as the setting for studying the effects of PCP on the innovation process. Albeit the 
findings are potentially transferable to other countries implementing PCP policy (see relevant 
discussion above), future research should explicitly aim at conducting a comparative analysis of PCP 
effects across countries. Such an endeavour might be useful, for instance, in terms of identifying 
country-specific institutional factors (North, 1990) hindering or enabling the innovation process. 
Second, the research focused on innovation process effects and studied those using an 
inductive, qualitative research design. Further research, of quantitative nature, is needed to establish 
links between these process effects (and related benefits) and the final outcomes and impacts of PCP 
e.g. in terms of commercialisation of technologies and long-term survival of small firms. This line of 
research should identify suitable (proxy) measures for studying process-related effects and their links 
to key outcomes, and make use of any existing data sets for econometric analyses (Onken et al., 2019).  
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Notwithstanding these limitations, the study provided in-depth insights regarding the role of 
PCP in addressing systemic failures and its positive influence on the activities, capabilities and 
behaviours of innovative small firms and the public organisations they engage with. More broadly, 
and in keeping with the focus of this Special Issue, the research opens up a fruitful avenue for further 
research on the strategic role of public procurement in pursuing, in tandem, innovation and small 
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Policy makers and innovation policy experts 
Department of BEIS Assistant Director: Innovation Procurement Policy 
Innovate UK SBRI Account Manager 1  [interviewed twice] 
Innovate UK SBRI Account Manager 2 
Innovate UK Regional Innovation Manager, NW England 
Warwick University  Former Director of Innovation Programmes at Innovate UK 
Cambridge University Expert and co-designer of the UK SBRI scheme  
The RSA Research Associate with expertise in the UK SBRI 
 Public buying organisations 
P1 Head of Operations 
P2 Head of Innovation (SBRI Programme Manager) 
P3 Chief Operating Officer; Assistant Commercial Director 
Small businesses 
S1 Founder and CEO 
S2 Co-founder and CEO 
S3 CEO 
S4 CEO 
S5 Founder and CEO 
S6 CEO 
S7 Senior Innovation Manager 






S14 Project Manager 
S15 Chief Executive 




S20 Technical Director 
S21 Co-founder and Technical Director 










Appendix 2. The interview guide  
 
Generic questions 
 Interviewee and organisation background information  
 Public procurement of R&D: UK policy design and aims 
 Overview of the SBRI process (implementation aspects) 
Small business-focused interview themes  
 Motivations to bid for SBRI contracts  
 Objectives regarding participation in SBRI projects 
 Description of the product /technology under development  
 Information re: number of tenders, contracts and funding amount  
 SBRI tendering process: views and experiences  
 Perceived benefits of the SBRI  
 Perceived challenges of the SBRI  
 Perceived quality and value of the SBRI programme 
 Commercialisation and adoption issues and effects  
 Current status and next steps  
Public organisation-focused interview themes  
 Motivations to adopt and use the SBRI 
 Main goals regarding use of the SBRI 
 Description of how the SBRI is implemented  
 Information about tendering process and contract awards 
 Capabilities required  
 Engagement with small firms  
 Perceived benefits of using the SBRI 
 Perceived challenges regarding the SBRI process 
 Perceived value of the SBRI 
 Links to commercialisation and commercial procurement processes  












Table 1: Profile of the technology-based small businesses included in the study 
Firm SBRI Phase(s) # R&D 
contracts 
Public sector area Description of innovative solution(s)   
S1 Up to Phase 2 2 Healthcare Screening solution (ECG device) for cardiac arrhythmias 
S2  Up to Phase 2 2 Healthcare E-platform connecting pharmacies with patients and clinicians 
S3 Up to Phase 1 1 Healthcare Transdermal Fluid Removal (TFR) technology  
S4 Unsuccessful bids 0 Healthcare E-medical records and data sharing solution 
S5 Up to Phase 3 2 Healthcare Sleep mask for treating diabetic retinopathy 
S6 Up to Phase 2 2 Healthcare Enuresis solution based on radio-frequency technology 
S7 Unsuccessful bids 0 Healthcare Bed capacity management solution for hospitals  
S8 Up to Phase 2 2 Healthcare Technology to diagnose faecal incontinence in patients 
S9 Up to Phase 2 7 Healthcare Application for self-management of persistent pain (chronic pain)  
S10 Up to Phase 1 1 Healthcare Accurate respiratory monitoring technology  
S11 Up to Phase 1 1 Healthcare Technology to assist communication of disabled children 
S12 




Multiple technologies e.g. assisting patients with brain injury in 
cooking 
S13 Up to Phase 3 3 Healthcare Hand-hygiene solution to combat hospital infections 
S14 Up to Phase 1 1 Healthcare Device to prevent bed falls for elderly people  
S15 Up to Phase 2  2 Healthcare Digital application to support patients with dementia to manage 
their hospital appointments  
S16 Up to Phase 1 3 Defence Military radio communications technologies 
S17 Up to Phase 1 1 Defence  Virtual training technology applications to defence 
S18 Up to Phase 2 3 Defence; Security  Infrared imaging and detection technologies  
S19 Up to Phase 2 30+ Defence; Security; 
Healthcare; 
Innovate UK 
Multiple technology areas e.g. antenna and communication for 
security 
S20 Up to Phase 2 5 Defence; Security; 
Energy 
Translational data analytics technologies  
S21 Up to Phase 2 2 Security Anti-counterfeiting technology for product and internet security  


















Table 2: Reported motivations of small businesses for participating in SBRI competitions and projects 
Small business motivations Systemic issues Indicative interview quotes 
Access to market and 
potential customers  
 









“We saw this opportunity as more than the funding, a lot more than 
the funding. This was our first easy gateway into interaction with 
the NHS, getting to understand more about the ecosystem and the 
funding that comes with it, but mostly about getting into that 
ecosystem because, eventually, what we are building is a product 
that is designed for the entire healthcare system” (Co-founder and 
CEO, S2) 
 
“One of the other contracts was looking at a device which was 
supposed to be trialled in Alder Hey Hospital and through that 
contract we’ve been able to make contacts there which, again, have 
been incredibly useful to us. So, we are pretty well connected and 
we’ve had an awful lot of mission input and potentially user input” 
(Managing Director, S8) 
 
Engage in cooperative R&D 
to address unmet needs 
 




Aligned goals: SBRI tenders 
fit for purpose 
Cooperation in R&D  “We led the project and it allowed us to subcontract to partners such 
as the University of Liverpool, Digital Catapult and regular retail 
specialists […] the SBRI definitely was the catalyst to bring us 
together” (CEO, S12) 
 
“It [the SBRI] allows you to work with companies which you wouldn’t 
work with otherwise. That’s a big positive […] it allows us to work 
with the cutting edge companies in our sector some really smart 
Cambridge based companies, the work we did was down there so it 
opened a new ecosystem for us so that was really good” (CEO, S12) 
 
“It was a good… in terms of the call focus, it was a good match, 
because the objective of the call was to identify solutions that could 
help to reduce hospital admissions and emergency care, so this is 




technology and its 




“In our business, we need to stay at the forefront of the technology 
and we have to get through some technical risks so the SBRI funding 
allows us to have a non-dilutive source of funding to demonstrate 
the technology to hopefully get it to a point where there would be 
either demonstrations to customers, so there is a customer pool or 
demonstration to investors where there is an investment to refine 
the product further” (CEO, S18) 
 
Light-touch administration of 
SBRI tenders and contracts 
Small firm access to 
government R&D 
contracting 
“SBRI is much more focused so it reduces opportunity costs, it 
reduces the entire cycle and probably the most important thing is 
that it brings you in direct contact with your end customer, which is 
the NHS” (Senior Innovation Manager, S7) 
 
“We are a big supporter of the SBRI model. We think that it has been 
carefully designed to be SME friendly. So, the focus on deliverables 
and outcomes of the project as opposed to activity and monitoring 
activity and monitoring how moneys are defrayed is, we think, a 








Table 3: Perceived benefits (+) and challenges (-) of SBRI implementation for participating small businesses and public buying organisations  
Small businesses  Public organisations Systemic issues Indicative interview quotes 
(+) Accessing and engaging 
with potential customers  
 
(+) Connecting and engaging 
with multiple stakeholders 
e.g. universities, other small 




(+) Establishing links and 
actively engaging with 






“One of the challenges facing medical device companies is getting access to the most stakeholders on the value-
based healthcare system, patients, doctors, nurses, procurement people. That can be quite challenging. The SBRI 
offers a mechanism for [S10] to approach all stakeholders to really road test the proposition within a new market, 
the UK market. What that helps us to do is accelerate time to market because we get ample access to the right 
people to figure out what their needs and wants are” (CEO, S10) 
 
“[…] they [P1] were trying to get a small business to collaborate together, that was good. They had an event where 
all the winners got together and the idea was can you collaborate with some of the others. It worked very well 
actually because some of the others had a similar idea but on a different area so maybe some of them were looking 
at more user interface or visualisation of your results as we were the ones producing the results so that was a really 
good idea” (Technical Director, S20) 
 
“Croydon Hospital […] was going to be our pilot site; so they had to be on board. Kingston University was with all 
our experts in requirement solicitation, we collaborated with the Department of Pharmacy in particular and they 
are very good at interfacing with the clinical side and extracting requirements and in general formulating the 
business solutions” (Senior Innovation Manager, S7) 
 
“The main idea is to engage with established defence suppliers, SMEs and academia and invite them to come up 
with solutions for us” (Head of Operations, P1). 
 
(+) Collaborative R&D with 
other public organisations, 
large and small firms and 
universities  
 
(-) Fragmentation and lack 
of coordination among units 
within government 
department 
(+) R&D collaboration 
with small firms, large 




“So, to all intents and purposes we’re working together to see if we can make a meaningful improvement in the 
efficiency of the NHS and in this particular instance to improve patient flow as partners or collaborators” (CEO, S10) 
 
“We use it [the SBRI] as a mechanism to be able to work under the pre-commercial procurement framework. It 
allows us to work with academics, businesses, in the UK and EU because there are various schemes, as I say, to get 
these new technologies developed where there is a gap between the academic capability and the fit for purpose 
spaces for technologies for use in large industries” (Head of Innovation, P2). 
 
“DSTL has to plan many, many years ahead, sometimes 20 years ahead […] but they can’t make the procurement 
managers in the Ministry of Defence adopt that technology. There’s a big gap and there’s a big gap also in mentality, 
because DSTL tend to be scientists pushing technology whereas Ministry of Defence tends to be operational pull” 
(Co-founder and Managing Director, S16). 
 
(+) Building technical 
knowledge and capabilities 
 








“So, what [the SBRI] has really done for us is that because we’ve been so exposed through the project to…it’s been 
real knowledge gathering exercise for us in that the interactions we’ve had with people within the NHS and specific 
regulatory and compliance organisations related to our work has really beefed up our knowledge. So, as a business, 
now, we have got a lot more to sell. We’ve gained a huge amount of knowhow, experience through the process” 





(+) Developing additional 
innovation ideas /projects 
 
(-) Lack of rich interactions 
with end users and limited 
feedback in some cases 
 
“So, off the back of that project we got to further develop some applications that we had been working on ourselves, 
doing our own R&D and it allowed us to get some of our ideas closer to market” (CEO, S12) 
 
“When we won that first CDE contract, that was really... opened many doors for us, because that got us in touch 
with a technical partner within DSTL what are called technical partner […] he comes and the first thing he does is 
tell you what’s wrong with your bid, because you may not be bidding for quite the right technology area that DSTL 
has in mind. So he has a lot of influence on the direction of the business […] the technology areas that he brought 
us into was military radio communications” (Co-founder & Managing Director, S16) 
 
“I would say that one of the improvements could be better access to people like that; serving officers or trainers […] 
and we were already told in the brief that it’s going to be next to impossible to get these people to help you  out so 
don’t … it actually said don’t start your project with requirements capture because they won’t… And I was like “oh, 
that is where I would normally start.” (CEO, S17). 
 
(+) Early-stage testing and 
feedback regarding potential 
of innovative product /idea 
 
(-) SBRI does not allow long-
term planning due to 
fragmented approach 
 
(+) Phased SBRI approach 
enables experimenting 
with new technologies at 
low risk 
 
(+) Collaboration with 
large suppliers to define 
unmet market needs 
 
(+) Appreciating the 
strategic role of 
procurement and its 







“It [the SBRI] gives us a mechanism to succeed and fail quickly and relatively cheaply. So if this is going to fail, let’s 
have it fail in three months at a cost of £30,000 rather than two years at a cost of £0.5 million” (SBRI Account 
Manager 1, Innovate UK).  
 
“Our challenges are all run in collaboration with large industry sponsors, in the main […] what we want to do is 
develop a product at the end of it that can then be accessed by the scientists in these large industries, whether it be 
for service, they buy a product and what it allows us to deliver our impact on the animal use while supporting 
businesses developing these new scientific technologies that, actually, are of benefit” (Head of Innovation, P2). 
 
“The model of SBRIs in general is too random. In other words, go quiet for six months and then a new call comes out 
[…] So rather than being a sustained prize that you can say, ‘Well, this funding is available and we know it’s going 
for the next five years, so let’s, based on that, make an investment so that sometime during the next five years we 
can have a chance at some of those calls.’ That’s not the case […] Instead, you just have to make your product and 
if you’re lucky that your product can qualify for their funding, then great” (CEO, S4) 
(+) Phase 1-2 approach 
facilitates access to 
government R&D contracts  
 
(-) Limited and /or 
discontinuous budgets for 
SBRI projects  
(+) Expanding R&D 
supplier network to 
include small firms and 
start-ups 
 
(-) Limited budgets for 
SBRI competitions 
Small firm access 
to government 
R&D contracting 
“[…] We really want to engage with populations we haven’t engaged before in order to build up a much wider 
network of research and development suppliers. So we are looking for stuff with relatively low level of maturity that 
we can get value out of” (Head of Operations, P1). 
 
“We definitely favour applying for a phase1/phase2 approach […] so that’s about letting the SMEs have a chance 
because the problem is that if you go straight into a half million to two-million-pound project why would we even 
apply for that if we know we’re going to be up against companies that are going to put a couple of dedicated people 
on it for three months to write out the bids” (Co-founder & Managing Director, S22). 
 
“We try as much as we can, yes, we’d like to do more but, as I say, it’s a resource and budget issue” (Head of 
Innovation, P2) 
Table 4: Institutional constraints influencing commercialisation and adoption of SBRI-funded technologies and products 
Key challenges Systemic issues Indicative interview quotes 
Limited support for 
commercialisation activities 
coupled with lack of small firm 




“I think whatever support SBRI can do to bridge across commercial sources of finance would be good. I think it is still quite difficult for 
companies, particularly companies whose business model is selling into the NHS to raise finance because the NHS sales cycle is seen as 
being very long, it’s quite political, it’s quite brittle” (CEO, S9). 
 
“We can go so far but we either run out of cash because the revenue never happens; engagement with the NHs is massively costly […] 
most private equity funds have a 3- to 5-year cycle. That does not match engagement with the NHS or the innovation cycle […] And, if 
you’re trying to get private equity funding in the UK based around engagement and, ultimately, commercialisation, then you are going 
to crash and burn, you are going to run out of cash” (CEO, S5). 
 
“Now I’ve developed something from SBRI, they’ve given us 100 grand to develop some wonderful piece of software, an app, smartphone 
app. How do I now get this smartphone app adopted by the NHS? Well NHS England want me as a small business to try and go out and 
sell with my one sales director and my two technical support guys to 221 Clinical Commissioning Groups. Now for me to get in to see 
those Clinical Commissioning Groups is a big marketing effort and a lot of manpower” (CEO, S1).  
Lack of commitment regarding 





“I mean SBRI, because it is pre-commercial procurement, has to stop short of procurement […] So what does particularly a small business 
do in those circumstances and we’ve been working hard to try to bridge that gap but we’re not allowed to just issue them with a 
procurement contract” (SBRI Account Manager 1, Innovate UK). 
 
“[…] internally within the NHS, the side that we’re dealing with, with regards to sourcing the product, it’s still separate and not exactly 
integrated with the side that actually brings the product to practice, that commissions the product and gives the product a recurring 
payment structure” (Co-founder and CEO, S2). 
Commercial procurement goals 
incentives not conducive to 
small business innovation  
Institutional constraints: 
public procurement rules 
and procedures  
“[…] the principal benefit of the device is probably in social care budgets. The people who might buy it are in community healthcare and 
because it’s new, they don’t have the budget for it. This is the problem that loads of SBRI projects face […]. If it were not  innovative, it 
wouldn’t get the SBRI funding. Yet, the fact that it’s innovative means there’s no budget for it” (Managing Director, S8) 
 
“What that procurement department will do is buy the injection and then sell it up and mark it up to the CCG at a profit. And then they 
tell us they’re making a profit as a department. And they say well, if we use your mask, we’re going to lose all this revenue. We point 
out the revenue is fiction, it’s a book-keeping exercise and what we’re trying to do is look for savings. They say no, if we don’t spend the 
money […] we lose the budget” (CEO, S5). 
Barriers to innovation adoption 
at pace and scale 
Institutional constraints: 
norms of conduct and 
behaviours within the 
public sector 
“One of the barriers to adoption is exactly that [culture and behaviour]. So something that I refer to is if you’re a doctor the first thing 
you get taught in med school is do no harm. You tend to then stick to what you know […] and you’re risk averse therefore because you 
want to do the right thing for the patient. Actually that’s slightly at odds with innovation because it makes you more tradit ional, makes 
you stick to what you know rather than actually look at what the art of the possible might be” (Assistant Commercial Director, P3) 
 
“A key reason [why it is difficult to see into the NHS] is institutional capture. There are so many committees, you go to a meeting and 
there need to be multiple people attending. These people are risk averse and they prefer not making decisions so as not to be held 
accountable, take risk and get fired. Nobody is held responsible for not making the right decisions” (CEO, S13). 
 
 
